A combination of theoretical argument and empirical evidence has made a persuasive case that the high level of corruption in many developing countries reduces efficiency. For example, Mauro (1995) and later papers have shown that corruption reduces growth, and Wei (2000) has shown that corruption reduces foreign direct investment. Development specialists also fear that corruption reduces equity. In this context, the burden of corruption is usually considered inequitable or regressive if the poor pay a higher fraction of their income in bribes than the rich. Evidence on this point has only recently begun to emerge, and reveals different results for different countries: Hunt and Laszlo (2006) show that the burden of bribery is approximately constant by income in Peru, whereas Herrera et al. (2005) show that the burden is regressive in several African countries.
In this paper I explore a different dimension of equity. I document the degree to which people pay bribes in connection with misfortune or adverse events they experience, with the consequence that the expense and possible disutility of bribery compound the original problem. I do so by using the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), with individual-level data from 37 transition, middle or low-income countries, and the Peruvian Household Survey (ENAHO), both of which contain information on bribery of public officials. The data sets are complementary, as the ICVS covers many countries and has detailed information on crime, while the Peruvian data set has a wealth of non-crime covariates and detailed information on bribery and especially use of public officials.
Misfortune or adverse events can lead an individual or household to bribe simply by increasing their need for public services. For example, victims of crime will want to report the crime to the police, an act that may require a bribe to ensure police cooperation. An illness, accident or assault may lead the victim to use public hospitals, which could involve a bribe to jump a queue or see a doctor. If a household member dies, his or her death must be registered, for which a bribe might be extorted. Burglary, robbery, fraud, job loss, fire, natural disasters, the death of an earner and the bankruptcy of a shop involve the loss of possessions or income, which may impoverish the affected individual or household and lead them to apply for unemployment insurance or welfare. The desertion of the household head can lead to legal issues concerning alimony or child custody, while the 1 creditors of a bankrupt shopkeeper may appeal to a judge. Involvement with the courts may be associated with bribery, for example of the opponent's lawyer. Individuals or households with such problems may also be more likely to bribe than other users of the same public officials, however. They may be more vulnerable to extortion or more willing to bribe than other users. Alternatively, the heterogeneity of services provided by an institution such as the municipal government may be relevant: those who have just experienced an adverse event may use particularly corruption-prone services within a particular institution, such as the establishment of eligibility for welfare.
It is difficult to judge which misfortunes and problems are most likely to lead to increased bribery. The magnitude of the effect would depend not only on the severity of the problem, but also on the degree of corruption of the institution to which victims would have recourse. As the police force is a very corrupt institution in many countries, problems with which the police would be associated, such as crime, could be expected to lead to frequent bribery. The purpose of the paper, however, is to demonstrate the relevance of a wide range of adverse events for bribery, rather than to emphasize differences between adverse events. I find that victims of misfortune, especially victims of crime, are substantially more likely to bribe than others, even after controlling for a wide range of individual and household characteristics. By contrast, victimization has no statistically significant effect on the amount paid in bribes, conditional on having paid a bribe. In the ICVS data, I
find that crime victims are between 2.9 and 8.2 percentage points more likely to bribe an official than similar non-victims, depending on the crime, compared to an overall bribery rate of 12.5%. In Peru, a crime victim is 6.3 percentage points more likely to bribe than a similar non-victim, compared to an overall bribery rate of 4.9%. For victims of other misfortunes, the corresponding increase in the bribery rate generally lies between 2.2 percentage points for a job loss and 3.8 percentage points for the death of a household earner, although natural disasters have no effect and unspecified other misfortunes have an 8.9 percentage point effect. For victims of all misfortunes, the increase in bribery is highest for bribes paid to the police. While it is possible that those prone to misfortune 2 have unobservable characteristics making them more likely to bribe, the Peruvian results are almost all robust to adding household fixed effects to the subsample that is a panel:
only the effect of serious illness appears to be overstated in the absence of fixed effects, while the effect of natural disasters may be understated.
The Peruvian data show that victims bribe more not only because they use more officials, but also because they bribe more than other users of the same officials. For the pairing of crime victims and the police, the combination with one of the highest bribery rates, the entire effect operates through greater use of the police. But for many pairings of misfortune and public official, the higher bribery compared to other users is at least as important as greater usage. This is true for victims of crime or shop bankruptcy in connection with the judiciary, and also for many victim types in connection with the municipal government.
In the case of crime victims and the police, it is evident that some of the higher usage must come from reporting the crime to the police. This appears not to be the only reason for increased usage, however, as the ICVS data indicate that crime victims who report their crime to the police do not have higher (or lower) bribery of the police than victims who do not report their crime. The Peruvian and ICVS results together suggest that crime victims who do not report their crime have an elevated police usage rate for reasons other than reporting. One possibility is that many unreported crimes are unreported because they are in fact perpetrated by the police. Another is that crime victims tend also to be perpetrators, and therefore come into contact with the police in their capacity as perpetrators, while being disinclined to report their own victimization to the police.
Individual micro-data have previously been used to show that richer households pay more frequent and larger bribes than poorer households, that people who know how to report corruption bribe less and that although bribers generally receive worse service, narrow benefits from bribing can be identified. 1 The results of the paper add to this limited knowledge of the process of bribery by individuals, and underline the extent to 3 which corruption lowers the quality of life by compounding other miseries. The results also reinforce other studies emphasizing the importance of combatting corruption in the police force, which is itself often set the task of reducing corruption in society.
Data
I use data from two sources: the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and the Peruvian household survey (ENAHO). In low-corruption countries, stigma may prevent respondents from answering honestly concerning bribery, so I drop high-income countries surveyed in the ICVS (see the Data Appendix for further discussion). In more corrupt countries, however, bribery is viewed as inevitable and the fault of the system, so stigma is low. Fear of prosecution (at least for small bribes, which are the majority of bribes)
should also be low, as most anti-corruption campaigns target officials. including whether the official asked for a bribe, gift, tip or "coima" (slang for bribe), whether the respondent felt obliged to make such a payment, made such a payment voluntarily, or refused to make such a payment, and the amount paid if she paid. 
International Crime Victim Surveys

Descriptive Statistics
Panel A column 1 of Table 1 
ICVS
The basic regression for the ICVS is a probit for the probability of an individual i in country c paying a bribe in year t:
C ict contains dummies indicating whether the individual was a victim of five main crime types, and the coefficients β 1 are the coefficients of interest. All specifications include three year dummies (δ t ) and country dummies (γ c ). Since some neighborhoods are chosen based on city size and neighborhood affluence, I present only specifications that control for the respondent's income quartile and city size among the X controls.
2 All specifications also control for dummies for the size of the household (to adjust household income, to adjust for the under-representation of large households introduced by interviewing only one household member, and to take into account the number of people on whose behalf the respondent might potentially pay bribes). I adjust the standard errors to allow for correlation among observations in the same region of a country (to allow for serial correlation where more than one year of data on a region is present), and report marginal effects.
I then investigate how the determinants of bribes vary according to the recipient of the bribe by estimating multinomial logits with six categories: the first (omitted) for no bribe paid, and the remaining five for bribes paid to the five types of official. 3 I report odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients).
2 I would like to control for the affluence of the neighborhood, but the regions I observe are generally considerably larger than the neighborhoods in question. 3 In the multinomial logits the coefficients on the dummies of three low-bribery countries are illconditioned for some categories of official, so I group them with a neighboring country. 
Peru's ENAHO
I estimate a similar probit for the probability that ENAHO household h in region r bribes an official type o in year t:
M contains dummies for nine misfortunes of which the household might have been a victim, and its coefficients β 3o are the coefficients of interest. The 2003 survey year is represented by t t , and γ r represents 24 region dummies. Since sampling is stratified by city size, I only present specifications that include city size dummies among the X controls.
I estimate five sets of probits for o representing any official, police, judiciary, municipal government and state schools. I adjust the standard errors to allow for correlation within districts (which are smaller than regions) and report marginal effects.
I also estimate a related probit where the seventeen officials other than police, judiciary, municipal government and schools are pooled, and the unit of observation is a household-official pair, rather than a household. In this case, I always present specifications controlling for official type dummies ν o :
Despite the rich set of covariates for which I control, it is possible that in both (2) and (3) shopkeepers are more likely to go bankrupt, and risk lovers always bribe more, the effect of shop bankruptcy on bribery will be biased upward by the omission of risk aversion.
To the extent that risk aversion is a fixed effect, the bias caused by its omission may be removed by using the panel subsample of the data to estimate household fixed effects δ h .
The reduction in the sample size means that this is only meaningful for estimating the probability of bribing any official:
I estimate this as a linear probability model. If the misfortune is so great as to change, say, a risk-lover into a risk-averse person, the bias caused by the omission of the original risk-aversion cannot be differenced out with fixed effects.
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While in principle the data permit a distinction between types of bribe and especially between bribes and refusals to bribe, in practice running multinomial logits instead of probits leads to large standard errors and insignificant marginal effects, so I do not pursue this.
It would be informative to present a decomposition of the unconditional bribery effect:
if a household that is a victim of misfortune bribes more, this could be either because it simply uses more officials (which indirectly increases bribery), because it is more likely to bribe the officials it uses than other users, or some combination of the two. As a first step I rerun the regressions above changing the dependent variable to the probability of using an official, then rerun the bribery regressions above with the sample of households who used the official. Using the results of these regressions for a decomposition would be a simple matter were they linear. The probability of a bribery episode P (B) is the product of the probability of using the official P (U ) and the probability of a bribery episode conditional on using the official P (B|U ):
where j represents V , for victims, or N V , for non-victims. The bribery gap between victims and non-victims is
which can be rewritten as
This decomposition is also valid conditional on X. However, it is not valid for nonlinear regressions such as probits. Owing to the low probabilities often involved in the regressions, probit and linear probability estimates of coefficients differ, so I prefer to use probits and forgo an exact decomposition. However, I calculate P (U )∆P (B|U, X) and P (B|U )∆P (U |X), and call these the conditional bribery and usage components, even though they only approximately sum to ∆P (B|X). I calculate the share due to conditional bribery by calculating its share of the sum of the two components. Table 4 reports the marginal effects, multiplied by 100, of criminal victimization on the unconditional probability of bribery in the ICVS. In column 1, the only other covariates are Table 2 indicated that victims consider robbery to be the most serious non-fraud crime, the effect of assault is as large as that for robbery.
Results
ICVS
One explanation for the victimization effects is that victims have to bribe the police when reporting the crime. This can be tested by adding to the specification interactions between the crimes and whether they were reported to the police, and checking whether the coefficients on the interactions are significantly positive. None of the interactions in column 3 has a significant marginal effect, and all except for fraud have a small point estimate. The interactions' marginal effects are also insignificant when the regressions are run on a sample of victims only, when controls for whether the victim viewed the crime as very serious are added, and when larceny is broken down into its five component parts (these results are not reported).
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In column 4, I repeat the column 2 analysis using an expanded sample including surveys with inconsistent or missing information on the type of official bribed (which is not relevant for this table). The results are very similar in the two columns. In column 5, I repeat the specification of column 2 with the sample of Latin American countries, which may be more similar to Peru. The effect of assault appears larger in Latin America, but otherwise the results are similar. In unreported regressions, the effects of victimization in Latin America also do not vary according to whether the crime was reported or not.
In Table 5 I examine the effect of criminal victimization on the bribery of various types of official. The odds ratios in Table 5 are from a single multinomial logit, with an omitted category of no bribe. The full covariates are included. The top left odds ratio of 1.96, for example, means that a person who is the victim of assault is about twice as likely to bribe a government official as not to bribe (96% more likely), by comparison with a nonvictim. The odds ratios are rather similar across columns, meaning that victimization causes similar percent changes in the probability of bribing various official types, rather than being higher for the police. This issue is discussed further below. The largest effects are for fraud, where the odds ratios are all above two, and the smallest effects are for larceny, where the odds ratios reflect bribery probabilities higher by only 31-59%.
In unreported multinomial logits, I have added interactions of the crimes with whether they were reported, to test whether crime victimization increases bribery through reporting. Of the 25 interactions, only four were significant, and one of these was significantly negative. I return to this puzzle later in the paper. 5 Coefficients on interactions for reporting the crime to an authority other than the police are also insignificant. Controlling for these greatly reduces the sample size, however.
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Peru's ENAHO
I begin by examining in some detail the effect of criminal victimization in the ENAHO in Tables 6-8 , before turning to the effect of other misfortunes and adverse events.
Criminal Victimization
Each marginal effect in Table 6 (columns 1-4) is the marginal effect on criminal victimization from a different probit for the unconditional probability of a bribery episode. As in all subsequent tables, the marginal effects are multiplied by 100 and therefore represent percentage point effects.
In Table 6 , as in Tables 7 and 8 percentage points, compared to an overall bribery episode probability of 4.9%. This large effect is similar to the effect of crime victimization found in the ICVS (between 2.9 and 8.2 percentage points in Table 4 ), where overall bribery is higher at 12.5%. The larger Peruvian effect relative to overall bribery is consistent with the possibility that the less detailed questioning of the ENAHO probably elicits reports of more serious crimes.
Panels B-F of Table 6 estimate the probability of a bribery episode for the four major official types and the seventeen pooled minor officials. One can see looking down the columns that the largest effects of criminal victimization are for the police, as would The results of Table 6 may appear to contradict the ICVS results of Table 5 , which
showed that criminal victimization increased bribery by a similar magnitude for each official type. However, the multinomial logit of Table 5 gives results in terms of the percent increase in the probability, rather than the percentage point increases given in Table 6 . The percent increases for the officials in Table 6 (column 4) are 140%, 200%, 58%, 40% and 47% for the police, judiciary, municipal government, schools and minor officials respectively. This transformation shows that the ICVS and ENAHO results are more similar than they appear, even if the ENAHO shows stronger evidence that the police and judiciary are more affected than other officials. The percentage point effects are more important for policy purposes, as they reflect how much overall bribery is increasing.
It is possible that criminal victimization is correlated with unobserved variables that cause individuals or households to bribe more. This may be tested by rerunning the regressions of I now turn to investigating how much of the unconditional bribery episode effects uncovered in Table 6 are the result of differences in usage of officials, and how much are the result of differences in bribery conditional on use of the official in question. The probits of Table 7 examine the probability of a bribery episode conditional on using an official.
Panel A shows that for the police, there is no significant conditional bribery effect, and in fact, the point estimates are negative. In Table 8 I return to the sample of all households, and examine the association between criminal victimization and the probability of using an official, in order to gauge The results of Tables 7 and 8 may be used to decompose the effect of misfortune on bribery into the indirect effect of higher usage of officials and the direct effect of higher bribery relative to other users. The direct effect of bribery represents -3% of the total effect for the police, 47% for the judiciary, 69% for the municipal government, and 87% for schools.
Hunt (2004), who used the ICVS data only, proposed that the reason for increased bribery of the police by crime victims regardless of whether they reported the crime was that crime victims lived in distrustful environments that also fostered bribery. However, as the Peruvian data show that the increased bribery comes wholly from a large increase in the usage of police, this interpretation seems unlikely to be correct.
Victims of All Misfortunes
In Table 9 I present the marginal effects of all nine misfortunes on the unconditional probability of a bribery episode. The marginal effects come from the regressions of column 4
in Table 6 . The synthesis of the many numbers is that most misfortunes increase bribery, and bribes to many types of official are affected by many types of misfortune. The official type most affected is the police, and crime is the misfortune with the largest effect (apart from "other misfortunes"), despite its being among the less severe misfortunes in Table 2 in terms of effect on standard of living.
For the probability of a bribery episode in connection with any official, column 1 shows that the largest effects are the previously reported effect of criminal victimization, a 6.3
percentage point effect, and the effect of "other" misfortunes, a statistically indistinguishable 8.9 percentage point effect. The marginal effect of a fire is large at 4.9 percentage points, but the small number of fires leads to large standard errors and insignificance.
Natural disasters have no significant effect, while the effects of other misfortunes lie in a range from 2.2 percentage points for a job loss to 3.8 percentage points for the death of an earner (within this range the effects are statistically indistinguishable).
Seven of nine misfortunes significantly increase the probability of bribing the police in column 2, with only the desertion of a household head and natural disasters insignificant.
For the judiciary in column 3, the effects are somewhat smaller and four of nine are significant. For the municipal government in column 4, the effects are smaller still, and although again four of nine are significant, the pattern is different from that for the judiciary. For example, there is no effect of shop bankruptcy, unlike for the judiciary, whereas there is a significant effect of illness/accident, probably reflecting the use of municipal medical clinics. Effects for schools in column 5 are less significant, while the pooling of officials in column 6 leads to greater significance despite much smaller effects.
The fixed effects regressions on the panel subsample may again be used to shed light on the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for the probability of bribing any official (these results are not reported). Adding fixed effects to a linear probability regression reduces the coefficient for three misfortunes, increases it for five misfortunes, and changes it little for criminal victimization, suggesting there is no systematic upward bias. There is a hint in the case of natural disasters and illness/accident that adding fixed effects makes a qualitative difference, although the standard errors involved are large. For natural disasters, the point estimate rises from 0.5 to 2.5 percentage points, with the latter effect significant at the 11% level. The point estimate for illness or accident falls from 2.4 to -0.8, but the former effect is only significant at the 10% level.
I also check the robustness of the Table 9 marginal effects to reclassifying refusals to bribe as a non-bribe rather than a bribe: refusals are 22% of bribery episodes. For the bribery of any official, the new marginal effects are on average 94% of the column 1 effects. The results for the police, municipal government and judiciary are also robust to this change.
As with criminal victimization, I am interested in how much of the increase in bribery caused by misfortune is caused by greater use of officials, and how much is caused by increased bribery compared to other users. However, the latter effect (corresponding to the regressions of Table 7 ) is insignificant for most misfortunes and for schools. I therefore present results in Table 10 for selected misfortunes and officials with larger such effects.
All marginal effects in odd columns examining the probability of using an official are statistically significant except one. The largest effect (even considering the unreported misfortune effects) is for the pairing of criminal victimization and the police: a crime victim is 11.3 percentage points more likely to use the police, compared to an overall usage rate of 5.5%. Next largest are all the "other" misfortune effects, which range from 6.2 percentage points for the police to 9.0 percentage points for municipal government.
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Two misfortunes have a very large effect on the probability of bribing the judiciary conditional on using the judiciary (column 4). Criminal victimization raises the probability by 15.3 percentage points, as already reported, and a shop bankruptcy raises it by 12.3 percentage points, compared to the bribery rate of 16.6% among judiciary users.
"Other" victimization raises conditional bribery of the police by 14.8 percentage points (though this is significant only at the 10% level, column 2), and several misfortunes raise conditional bribery of the municipal government by statistically significant amounts that are large compared with the conditional bribery rate of 4.8%: "other", illness/accident and crime (column 6).
In Table 11 I report the share of the overall bribery effect due to higher bribery of victims compared to other users (conditional bribery), for the misfortunes and officials of Table 10 . The first row repeats numbers for criminal victimization cited in the text above.
For the other four misfortunes, this component represents only a quarter of the effect on the police. For the judiciary the results are more varied. For job loss, illness/accident and "other", most of the effect comes through usage, while for shop bankruptcy and crime about half the effect is conditional bribery and half usage. For the municipal government, the shop bankruptcy effect comes mostly through usage, while for the other misfortunes the effects comes mostly through conditional bribery.
I have extended the analysis to seek effects of misfortune on the amount of a bribe 6 Almost all misfortunes increase the usage of the police, judiciary and municipal government. The pairings for which the relationship is insignificant are fire-judiciary and sickness/accident-municipal government. Most misfortunes do not statistically significantly increase the usage of schools, while almost all increase the usage of the pooled other officials.
paid, conditional on a bribe being paid. However, all marginal effects are insignificant, owing to the limited sample size and associated large standard errors.
Conclusions
In this paper, I show that victims of misfortune and adverse events, particularly crime victims, are much more likely to bribe than non-victims. This holds even after conditioning on a variety of individual and household characteristics, as well as household fixed effects. The results hold with both cross-country and Peruvian micro-data. Victims of misfortune are more likely than non-victims to use public officials, particularly the police, which indirectly leads to more bribery. However, in many situations victims also bribe more than other users who are not victims. In such cases, victims may be more vulnerable or more desperate for service than other users, or they may have need of a more corrupt service (for example, establishing eligibility for benefits) than non-victims using the same institution. Whichever route leads the victim to the corrupt interaction with the official, the expense or disutility associated with the interaction compounds the original misfortune. People encounter corruption at the most difficult times of their lives, which is a form of inequity.
Misfortune especially spurs bribery of the police and judiciary. Of note among the detailed results is the frequent bribery of police by crime victims, caused by victims' very high use of police. The puzzle is that this high use or contact is apparently not principally the result of the reporting of crimes to the police, raising the possibility that the police commit crimes or that crime victims are also perpetrators of crime. The frequent bribery of the judiciary by crime victims and bankrupt shopkeepers is distinctive for the important role played by higher bribery compared to other users, as is the bribery of the municipal government by victims of several misfortunes.
6 Data Appendix
International Crime Victim Surveys ICVS
The data are available at www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/data.php. I wish to drop countries with a sufficiently low bribery rate that stigma would impede honest answers to the survey. Low bribery countries are almost all rich countries, and I prefer to use GDP per capita as the criterion for inclusion rather than bribery, which will be the dependent variable. This means South Korea and Malta are excluded despite having higher bribery than two included countries. I include Slovenia, whose GDP per capita is similar to that of Malta and South Korea but whose bribery rate is lower, in order to include the complete set of European ex-communist countries. For most of the analysis I also drop 19 surveys (five of them for countries not otherwise represented in the sample) where the list of official types presented to respondents who bribed was longer than in the other surveys, or where the official type information was missing.
I recode victims of crimes occurring abroad as non-victims. In many of the surveys of cities, the variable called city size appeared to refer to the population of the neighborhood, not the city, or was missing. Using www.citypopulation.de and the region variable, I corrected these observations.
Peru's ENAHO
The data are available at www.inei.gob.pe/srienaho/English/Consulta por Encuesta.asp. The twenty-one types of official listed in the survey are: municipal government, social security (providing social insurance other than pensions), state banks, judiciary, drinking water, telephone, electricity, state schools, arbitration, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Industry and Tourism, tax/customs authority (SUNAT), state hospitals, national civil identification registry, Department of Migration, police, electoral office (ONPE), electoral court (JNE), development agency (FONCODES), food agency (PRONAA), and "other".
Are the bribery rates plausible?
While the bribery rates in some of the ICVS surveys are low -only 1.4% in Slovenia and 3.0-3.1% in Botswana and Hungary, for example -the high bribery rates in some countries suggest respondents were not afraid to answer the ICVS questions. The Peruvian ENAHO bribery (episode) rate of 4.9% is lower than the lowest ICVS Latin American bribery rate (of 5.3% for Argentina in 2001), raising the possibility that respondents may have been less eager to answer a government-sponsored survey. However, the ENAHO bribery episode rates for some official types are very high (37% for the police), indicating that, at least for some official types, respondents were not ashamed or afraid to acknowledge a bribery episode. The stigma associated with bribery in Peru is not large: Proética, a Peruvian anti-corruption group, found that when asked to define the Peruvian slang for bribe ("coima"), less than half their survey respondents gave answers with a negative connotation.
7 Furthermore, the Peruvian household survey does not attempt to force respondents to admit to having voluntarily paid a bribe, but allows them merely to acknowledge having paid a tip under duress. I therefore do not believe that reluctance to report is a major issue.
A Proética's bribery rates, conditional on the use of particular officials, look very similar to those in my data, but their usage rates look implausibly high for a window of one year. This suggests that the Proética time frame, not reported in the documentation available to me, was in fact much longer than a year, even though yearly bribery rates are reported.
The share of households or individuals bribing and the number of bribes will be understated if clients commonly use agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and officials, and bribes paid by the agent are reported in the survey by the agent (or no-one), rather than the client. A 2003 survey by Proética gathered information on bribes and agents ("tramitadores") in Peru.
10 52% of respondents who had bribed to obtain a driver's licence reported having paid the bribe to an agent, while the share was 15% or less for the other nine activities reported in the summary statistics. 11 The number of bribery episodes per household is also understated because each respondent can only report one bribery episode per year (per year per official, in the Peruvian case). Another issue is that corrupt officials may demand a fee that clients do not recognize as a bribe. Taking the various factors into consideration, it seems inevitable that my surveys somewhat underestimate bribery of public officials, but I do not believe the underestimation to be severe. Notes: Marginal effects of probits, multiplied by 100. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, adjusted for correlation within regions of countries. All regressions include three year dummies, household size dummies, country dummies, and a missing income quartile dummy. The "other covariates" are respondent sex, age, education and labor force status, and household ownership of vehicles. The sample of extended countries also includes those countries whose survey offered respondents who bribed a longer list of official types; in the specification for this sample the covariates include a dummy indicating these countries. Notes: Columns 1-4 contain marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. Each marginal effect is the marginal effect on the dummy for household criminal victimization from a different regression. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In panels A-E an observation is a household; in panel F it is a household-official pair. One region had no bribes to school officials and is combined with a neighboring region for the schools regressions containing region dummies. "Main household, respondent characteristics" are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, and occupation in public administration; dummies for household region (24), size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15; and a control for travel time to the district administrative center. Notes: Columns 1-4 contain marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. Each marginal effect is the marginal effect on the dummy for household criminal victimization from a different regression. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In panels A-E an observation is a household; in panel E it is a household-official pair. One region had no bribes to school officials and is combined with a neighboring region for the schools regressions containing region dummies. "Main household, respondent characteristics" are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, and occupation in public administration; dummies for household region (24), size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15; and a control for travel time to the district administrative center. Notes: Columns 1-4 contain marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. Each marginal effect is the marginal effect on the dummy for household criminal victimization from a different regression. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In panels A-D an observation is a household; in panel E it is a household-official pair. "Main household, respondent characteristics" are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, and occupation in public administration; dummies for household region (24), size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15; and a control for travel time to the district administrative center. Notes: Marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. In columns 1-5 an observation is a household; in column 6 it is a household-official pair. There are too few bribes to municipal government and schools by victims of fire to include a dummy for this misfortune in the bribery regressions for municipal government and schools. "All other covariates" are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, job type and occupation in public administration; dummies for household region, size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15, change in standard of living (including town) and food aid locations; controls for travel time to the district administrative center and log household consumption; and for column 6, official type dummies. Notes: Marginal effects from probits, multiplied by 100. T-statistics clustered by district are in parentheses. An observation is a household. "All other covariates" are controls for age of respondent, its square, and respondent years of education; dummies for respondent sex, marital status, sex*marital status, job type and occupation in public administration; dummies for household region, size, acquisition of home through land invasion, presence of children aged 0-3, 4-7, 8-11, or 12-15, change in standard of living (including town) and food aid locations; and controls for travel time to the district administrative center and log household consumption. 
